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Safety distances are widely used for preventing incidents caused by unintended interference 
between two activities or for preventing harmful consequences from an incident to objects or 
people in the vicinity. EIGA [1] has expressed this as: “Safety distances need to be 
considered as a generic means for mitigating the effect of a foreseeable incident and 
preventing a minor incident escalating into a larger incident.” Some countries have specific 
regulations, expressing required distances based on standard equipment, while others also 
allow a performance based approach using guidelines or codes on how to determine safety 
distances. For hydrogen equipment, specific requirements for safety or separation distances 
are being established for Gaseous Hydrogen refuelling stations e.g. in NFPA 55: 2010 [2], in 
2003 International Fire Code [3] as well as in the ISO TS 20100: 2008 [4]. There is also 
ongoing work on safety distances within ISO/TC197/WG11. 
The challenge is to provide an approach allowing to standardize installation requirements in 
order to facilitate the deployment of a fuelling station infrastructure, while allowing for non 
standard designs and adaptation to technological progress. This paper discusses the 
approaches implemented in the different standards and also compares the approaches to 
that of the European Gas Industry Group (EIGA) guideline [1]. The EIGA safety distance 
procedure has been applied to a hydrogen refuelling station (Figure 1) designed by HySafe 
participants, to avoiding confidentiality issues. The results and recommendations are 
obtained from comparison and discussion of the results. The work was done by the Risk 
Assessment work package in the EU 6th FP HySafe NoE (HySafe). 
Safety distances are determined using different methodologies. An example is the concept of 
consequence lengths that determines the impacts of releases and fires up to a certain harm 
criteria, which represents a deterministic approach. Another approach is being used in QRA 
where the safety distance is determined using the Individual risk (IR) and/or societal risk 
criteria (SRC). For determination the frequency of each failure is multiplied with the 
probability of a certain consequence depending on the distance to the incident location. All 
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products are summed to give the overall individual risk as a function of distance, that is the 
risk to an unprotected person placed permanently a certain distance from the accident 
source. The SRC is basically the same approach, but is also regarding the population density 
around the object of concern.  
The EIGA methodology is comparable to the described for QRA. The main difference is the 
initial exclusion of incidents of very low frequency. The EIGA guideline uses a per incident 
acceptance threshold criterion of Ft < 3.5 x 10-5 per annum; for each potential hazardous 
event the frequency shall not exceed 3.5 x 10-5 per annum. For events with a higher 
frequency, safety distances must be established. This means that for each event the 
tolerance criterion applied in the EIGA guideline is  
 3.5 x 10-8 fatalities per annum 
 3.5 x 10-7 cases of considerable material damage per annum 
The European guideline for risk based safety distances for land use planning [5] suggests an 
acceptance criterion for individual risk of 10-5, with an ALARA (As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable) region between 10-6 and 10-5. The IEA HIA Task 19 Hydrogen Safety has 
suggested similar criteria for hydrogen infrastructure [6]: Individual risk < 10-5, with an ALARA 
region between 10-7 and 10-5.  
In comparison, the EIGA guideline criterion appears to be more strict, but as the contribution 
from major accidents with a frequency less than 3.5 x 10-5  is not included, the criterion can 
be said to be line with generally accepted levels for tolerable risk.  
”Harm" and "no harm" criteria for fire and explosions proposed for calculations of safety 
distances in the guideline are given in the table below. 
Table 1: Criteria for fire and explosions. 
Hazard target “no harm” criterion 
events likely during lifetime 
“harm” criterion 
events not likely during lifetime 
Fire people 1.6 kW/m2 9.5 kW/m2 (sustained fire) 
Fire equipment  37.5 kW/m2 
flash fire  ½ LFL LFL 
explosion people 2 kPa 7 kPa 
explosion equipment  20 kPa 
 
The “no harm” criteria are rather strict: The radiation criterion (1.6 kW/m2) which is 
comparable to solar radiation on a bright day and is the level defined as acceptable 
maximum for continuous exposure (from a flare) in API 521 [7]. The explosion criterion is far 
below what is reported as harmful for humans, except for secondary effects from broken 
glass. In this study the criteria are applied as recommend though. 
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Figure 1: Hydrogen refuelling station evaluated. 
In total more than 50 hazards were identified. For most of these risk reducing measures are 
already recommended practice: E.g. for ventilation failure for the hydrogen compressor 
building: The control system will shut down the container (compressor and all electrical 
equipment inside the container) in case of ventilation failure (or failure of air flow confirmation 
signal). In addition, the safety system will give an alarm if hydrogen is detected at 10 % of 
flammable level shut down the container at 25 %. The frequency of a ventilation failure 
causing a potentially harmful effect was thus evaluated as well below 3.5 x 10-5. 
Safety distances were done for the scenarios listed:  
Scenario 1A: Small leak in outside storage bank valves. Leak, and if ignited, exposure of 
storage bottles. A total content of 50 kg (5 tanks 10 kg each) of hydrogen means this could 
lead to a fire of very long duration.  The leak is modelled in PHAST [8] as a 0.5 mm hole size, 
which will give a leak of 4.4 g/s and a jet fire length of 1.3 meters. The modelled range of 
radiation above 1.6 kW/m2 (no harm) is similar to the range of the jet. Within the jet flame 
envelope the temperature will be sufficient to cause damage to exposed equipment as well 
as harm to people.  
Scenario 1B: Escalation of 1A by tension cracks and possibly rupture of exposed bottle(s). 
Release of content of one storage bank and immediate ignition of release. Atex (zone 2) 
classification of equipment will reduce (but not eliminate) ignition probability. This event 
(rupture of exposed bottle) is evaluated as not likely to occur during the lifetime of the project, 
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and the safety distance is thus calculated for “harm” criteria: radiation of 9.5 kW/m3 for 
people and 37.5 kW/m3 for equipment.  
Each storage bank consisting of 5  10 kg bottles connected with 8 mm pipes. Modelling the 
release in PHAST [8] gives a leak rate of 1 kg/s and a maximum jet fire length of 15 meters, 
which also is the range of radiation levels above 37.5 kW/m3. Radiation above 9.5 kW/m3 has 
a range of 20 meters.  
Preventing scenario 1A from escalating into scenario 1B cannot be achieved by increasing 
the distance. One will thus either have to implement measures to reduce the frequency of 
scenario 1B below the Ft or base the safety distancing on scenario 1B. 
Scenario 2: GH2 leakage, most likely caused by vehicle drive away. Safeguards: Flow 
restriction in filling line, limiting the flow to 6 grams per second and EXV valve (flow actuated 
normally open shut off valve) close to dispenser. Modelling the release in PHAST gives a jet 
fire length of 1.5 meters for an ignited leak and the estimated maximum extent of a flash fire 
(distance to ½ LEL) of 5 meters. The EXV will limit the duration of the leak and the probability 
of a delayed ignition and a flash fire. For a jet fire the “no harm” safety distance should thus 
be set to 1.5 meters. For the less likely event of a flash fire the “harm” criterion may be 
applied – which gives a distance of 3 meters. 
Scenario 3: Refuelling started with (undetected) minor leak. Pressure drop too small for EXV 
valve to close (assumed leak rate of 10 % of maximum filling rate). Flow restriction will work. 
Modelling the release in PHAST gives a jet fire length of 0.5 meters for an ignited leak and 
an estimated maximum extent of a flash fire of 2 meters. 
Scenario 4: GH2 leak inside compressor enclosure. Small quantity of hydrogen within 
process equipment. Release rate will decay immediately after detection and shutdown. 
Safeguards: Gas detection, alarm, automatic shut down if 0.25 LEL or ventilation failure.  
Relief panels opening at 0.1 bar overpressure. Frequency for an overpressure exceeding 0.1 
bar is less than 3.5 x 10-5. Utilising the Multi Energy Method [9] this gives a resulting 
overpressure below 7 kPa (harm criterion) at 6 meters distance. 
The distances are compared to recommended distances from the HyApproval [10] project in 
the table below.  
Table 2: Comparison of safety distance with HyApproval distance. 
Case Frequency Effect Criterion Safety distance HyApproval distance 
1A Likely jet fire no harm 1.3 m  
1B < proj. life jet fire harm 20 m (people) 
15 m (material) 
“L2 large jet” 
21 m 
2 likely jet fire no harm 1.5 m - 
2 unlikely flash fire harm 3 m 6 m 
3 likely jet fire no harm 0.5 m - 
3 likely flash fire no harm 2 m - 
4 unlikely Explosion harm 6 m 6 m 
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The seen variations in calculated distances are related to different hole size and to different 
operational pressures. 
Comparing the distances to separation distances or “setback” distances in different fire 
codes is done in the table below. 
Table 3: Comparison of the distances to separation distances. 
Case Safety distance ISO/TS 20100 [4] 
V>10 000 l 
International Fire 
Code[3](V<120m3) 
NFPA 55 [2] 
1A 1.3 m 4 m to sidewalk 
8 m to public area 
6 m (combustible) 
1.5 m 0 m (workers) 
4.6 m (public/cust.) 
3 m (equipment) 
1B 20 m (people) 
15 m (material) 
1.5 m 
  P<=45 MPa   
2 3 m 3m (sidewalk) 
4m (public area) 
0 0 
3 2 m 3m (sidewalk) 
4m (public area) 
0 0 
4 6 m 3m (sidewalk) 
4m (public area) 
0 0 
 
All the codes reviewed recommends distances for storage of hydrogen. ISO TS 20100 [4] 
also give recommendations for filling, but the options for taking safeguards into account is 
limited; this is demonstrated clearly by Case 1A/1B. 
The determination of frequencies and the modelling of the resulting consequences involve a 
degree of uncertainty that will influence the resulting safety distances. This has been 
addressed in the ASSURANCE project [11].  E. g. for an ammonia plant the predicted radius 
at IR = 10-6 per year ranged from 820 to 1325 m. It was found that the determination of 
frequencies was considerable more uncertain than the results of the modelled 
consequences. In practice and especially for the new hydrogen economy it is difficult to find 
specific reliability data. For the determination of reasonable safety distances (in standard 
development as well as in installation specific calculations) it is very important to 
continuously collect and file appropriate safety data and to make commonly agreed data 
available for the stakeholders. 
One conclusion from this study and the comparison is that safety distance calculations 
specific to the solutions chosen for an installation is worth the effort as general 
recommendations can not reflect all possible variations in technical solutions. The EIGA 
method also has a potential for standardised recommendations for a specific station design: 
Comparing the “HyApproval station” to this station, the variation in safety distances is related 
to differences in pipe diameters, operational pressure and assumed safety equipment. It 
would however be recommendable to do a thorough review of the harm criteria and bring 
them more in line with recent research and accident experience.  
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